Implicitly defined (and easily approximated) universal constants 1.1 < an < 1.6, n = 2, 3, ... , are found so that if XI [a, b), then E (max {XI , .. , , Xn })s up {EXt: t E Tn} + bn(b -a) , where again the bound bn is best possible. In both situations, extremal distributions for which equality is attained (or nearly attained) are given in implicit form.
1. Introduction. Let Tn denote the set of stop rules for random variables Xl, X n • If the {X;} are independent and non-negative, then it has been shown [4] that (1) E(max{X., ... ,X n }) S 2 sup {EX, : t E Tn} and that 2 is the best possible bound, and [2] that in fact strict inequality holds in all but trivial cases. If the {X;} are independent and take values only in [a, b] , then (2) E(max{X., ... ,X n }) S sup {EXt : t E Tn} + ('!4)(b -a), and 1/ 4 is the best possible bound [3] . Probabilistic interpretations have been given for these results: (1) says that the optimal return of a gambler (player using non-anticipating stop rules) is at least half that of the expected return of a prophet (player with complete foresight) playing the same game; and (2) says that a side payment of 'h the game limits, paid by the prophet to the gambler, makes the game at least favorable for the gambler.
If the random variables in question are not only independent, but also identically distributed, then it turns out that the gambler's situation improves, and the constants "2" and "'14" in (1) and (2) respectively can be improved (lowered). The purpose of this paper is to determine these improvements. Probabilistically, the main results give the minimal odds and side payments, respectively, needed to achieve fairness for a gambler matched against a prophet playing the same game (in which the random variables are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.».
Implicitly defined (and easily approximated) universal constants 1.1 < an < 1.6, n = 2, 3, "', are found (e.g., a2 :;;; 1.171, alOO :;;; 1.337, alO,OOO :;;; 1.341) satisfying the first main result, Theorem A. THEOREM A. If n > 1 and XI, X 2 , " ; , X n are Li 
En (X).
PROOF. If X is constant, the conclusion is trivial with Y = X. Otherwise, P (X < VI (X» > 0, P(X > Vn-I(X» > 0, and °< VI(X) < · · · < Vn-I(X) < 1. 
The conclusion follows from these results and the dichotomy that
(X> a).P(Y> a) > 0, and =E(XV Y) if P(X> a).
P (Y > a) = 0. The strict inequality in this dichotomy follows since for is purely analytical (non-probabilistic) in nature, is to define. the constants {an} and {bn} appearing in Theorems A and B, respectively, and to concurrently develop results useful in the proofs of these theorems.
and T/j,n (a) = <Pn (T/j-I,n (a), a).

LEMMA 3.2. T/j,n is continuous, non-negative, strictly increasing and concave for all
n > 1, and all} = 0,1, ... , n. 
For j = n -1, this yields
completing the proof of (a). Given a E [0,1] with Gn(a) S 1, observe thatllo,n(a) = T/o,n(a) = a/(n -1), and assume
n (a). S T/j-I,n (a). Since °S T/o,n (a) S T/I,n (a) S ... S T/n-I,n (a) = Gn (a) S 1 and
completing the proof of (3). Hn(f3n) = 1. Moreover, °< f3n < 1. 1] , and which has no points in common with u.
Since {is decreasing on [1, 00] , in order to show that g (fJ) = {(lln -I, n(f3» ~ {(knf3 1] , it suffices to show that 
Proof of Theorem A and its extremal distributions. DEFINITION 4.1. For a random variable X with
Probabilistically, R n (X) is the odds which must be given a gambler playing against a prophet (faced with the same n i.i.d. random variables each with distribution that of X) in order to make the game fair for the gambler. (In terms ~f R n , Theorem A simply states that Rn(X) < an for all distributions X, and that the bound an is the best possible.) PROOF OF THEOREM A. Fix n > 1. The case where X has infinite expectation is trivial, so assume EX < 00. First, it shall be shown that it suffices to consider random variables taking values in [0, 1] by proving that 
The conclusion of Theorem A follows once it is shown that (8) there exists a unique point (so, , Sn-1) with 0 < So < < Sn-2 < Sn-1 = 1 for which R n (so, ... , Sn-1) < R n (so, , Sn-1) = an for all (so, there is a unique point (so, ... , Sn-2) with 0 < So < < Sn-2 < 1 for which max{r n (so, ... , Sn-2); 0 :::; So:::; · .. :::; Sn-2 < I} = r n (so, , Sn-2) = an. 
for O:::;}:::; n -3, and n -1 = ns~=~ + (n -l)s8, and at (so,···, Sn-2) satisfying these n -2 equations, rn (so, ... ,
letting a = (n -l)s8, T/j,n (a) = sJ for O:::;}:::; n -2, 1 = T/n-1,n (a) = G n (a), and at (so,···, Sn-2) satisfying these equations, rn(so,
Let B C /Rn-1 be the region B = {(so, · · ., Sn-2); Sj ~ 0 for} = 0, · · ., n -2}. By (lOa-d) and Proposition 3.4 there is a unique point (.~o, · · ., Sn-2) in the interior of B at which arn/ aSj = 0 for} = 0, · · ., n -2, and at this point rn (so, · · ., Sn-2) ~ 1 + (n -l)s8 > 1. Thus the maxima and minima for r n in B, if they exist, occur at (so, · · ., Sn-2) or on the boundary of B. Jfowever, if Sj = 0 for some} = 0, -. · ., n -2, or if Sj ~ 00 for some or all} = 0, · · ., n 2, then r n (so, ... , Sn-2) :::; 1. Thus the maximum for r n in B is at (so, ... , Sn-2). Since 0 < So < · · · < Sn-2 < 1 from (10d), Definition 3.1, and Lemma 3.2, and since {(so, · · ., Sn-2); 0 :::; So:::; · · · :::; Sn-2 < I} C B, it follows that (10d), Proposition 3.4, and Definition 3.10 imply that (9) holds.
That the bound an is sharp is clear from the above reasoning (see also Proposition 4.4. The assumption of non-negativity in Theorem A is essential, as the following example shows. Probabilistically, Dn(X) is twice the side payment which must be paid to a gambler . playing against a prophet (faced'with the same n independent random variables each with distribution that of X) in order to make the game fair for the gambler. In terms of Dn , the conclusion of Th~orem B is that Dn(X) :::; b n for all n, and that the bound bn is the best possible and is attained. otherwise.
(
It remains only to show that (12)
First observe that the following representations hold for (so, ... , Sn-1) with Sj > 0 for j = 0, ... , n -2 and 0 < Sn-1 < 1:
where fl.l = V 1(so, ••• , sn-d, the expression in Lemma 2.5(ii). From (13) it can be deduced that the following three statements are equivalent for (so, ... , Sn-1) with Sj > 0 for j = 0, • • • , n -2 and 0 < Sn-1 < 1.
aDn .
, and at (so, ... , Sn-l) satisfying these n equations, Dn(so,
, and at (so, · · · , Sn-l) satisfying these n equations, Dn(so,
Let C be the region C = {(so, The parenthetical conclusion in Theorem B that E (min {Xl, ... , X n }) ~ inf {EXt: t E ~ Tn} -bn(b -a) is immediate'by symmetry. In contrast, no corresponding universal constant exists for ratio comparisons of E(min{X I , ••• , X n }) and inf{EX t : t E Tn}. See example 4.1 in [3] .
Although the authors believe that the constants {an} and {b n } are monotonically increasing, and hence convergent, they have not been able to demonstrate this nor identify the limits.
